This paper models and empirically tests a self-enforcing feature of the value added tax (VAT) which is absent in the theory: An incentive that makes formal traders buy from suppliers who pay VAT too. In addition, it explores how the government can deploy this feature to enforce VAT more efficiently by reallocating the enforcement spendings among different sectors. The results suggest that the government should identify the non-compliant firms more strictly in the backwardly linked sectors -which buy their inputs from the others-and focus on revealing within-firm information. In contrast, in forwardly linked industries, the government should zoom on double checking the transaction records with the corresponding input credit claims. Empirical evidence from Indian service sector enterprises strongly confirms the existence of VAT self-enforcement effect, even in the absence of government punishments.
Introduction
Value added tax (VAT) has been an essential element of tax reform since its first establishment in 1950s. It is now adopted in near 140 countries and many of them are among the poorest, thus its optimal design is a key challenge especially for developing countries. Recent studies in public economics model VAT from different angles. Some, on more broad level, compare the efficiency of VAT to the other indirect taxes like tariff and RST (e.g. Emran and Stiglitz [2005] ), while others concentrate on its optimal policies like rates and exemption levels (e.g. Keen and Mintz [2004] ). However, to date, little research has been focused on VAT evasion and avoidance and this area is almost neglected by theorists. Basically, VAT has a self-enforcing feature in the sense that each formal trader wants its supplier to be formal too, because it needs a proper VAT invoice for getting input credit. By modeling the feature, this paper sheds new light on optimal tax enforcement under a VAT system. It shows how the government can make VAT less vulnerable to fraud and evasion by designing the optimal allocation of enforcement among different activities. Hence, this paper focuses on how VAT administration should behave to maximize revenue given enforcement is costly.
As a first shot, I present a stylized fact from the UK economy. consumption in a sector. One of the possible explanations for this can be a self-enforcing feature in VAT, in the sense that sectors with more business-to-business (less business-to-household) transactions comply more.
Consequently, one can question how the optimal enforcement policy changes across different activities? This paper analyses this question in detail and tries to find an answer for that.
The aim of this paper is to construct a model and perform an analysis of the optimal VAT enforcement policy. I start with an input-output (I-O) model and define forward and backward linkages in that setting.
Moreover, I elaborate how the government can fight informality and explain cross-checking invoices -matching each input credit claim with a corresponding output tax payment-as a distinct enforcement tool in a VAT system. The results suggest that in each sector, the optimal government enforcement is positively associated with the backward linkages of that sector. Furthermore, the government should focus on revealing internal information of the firms by policies like rewards to whistle blower. In comparison, in the forwardly linked industries the government should concentrate on arm-length transactions and double checking the invoice with the corresponding input credit claim. In the next step, I show that the results of the model are robust to relaxing Leontief production function assumption and assuming a general CES function. Finally, I examine the existence of self-enforcing feature of VAT using Indian service sector data of over 54,000 enterprises. The results confirm a positive relationship between activity's forward linkages and VAT registration even when firms are not obliged to register. Such a relationship is not significant for backward linkages.
The nexus of indirect tax policy and the size of the informal sector has been the subject of a number of contributions in the literature. Emran and Stiglitz [2005] study the inefficiencies of VAT compared to tariff in an economy with a large informal sector. They argue that the standard policies to replace trade taxes with VAT reduces welfare under plausible assumptions, given the size of informal market in developing countries.
Their arguments based on the assumption that the informal sector may escape from paying VAT, but cannot avoid border taxes. The follow-up by Keen [2008] argues that Emran and Stiglitz [2005] undervalue the power of VAT to absorb revenue under large informal sector by neglecting the intermediate inputs in the production side of the economy. He explores the function of VAT as a tax on the inputs of the informal sector because non-compliant firms are unable to recover the VAT paid on the inputs bought from compliant firms. However, he mentions that the existence of a large informal sector can invalidate the conventional policies on replacing trade taxes with VAT and the ability of the government to reduce informality can shift the optimal policy toward VAT. For modeling informality, this paper uses a same framework as Emran and Stiglitz [2005] and Keen [2008] , in the sense that the number of formal and informal firms are given, while informal producers set their production level according to the tax rate and enforcement policies. The empirical evidence in this field also emphasizes the importance of an efficient design and administration of VAT especially in developing economies. Baunsgaard and Keen [2010] in a panel study of 117 countries, show that recovering the loss in trade taxes with VAT has failed in low income countries in spite of its success in the developed world. This paper, although does not directly discuss trade taxes, gives straightforward policy recommendations to solve the enforcement inefficiencies in VAT for overcoming the problem of revenue loss in replacing border tax with domestic sources.
On the tax enforcement side, the literature points to the close connection between tax administration efficiency and information gaps -for a survey see Slemrod and Yitzhaki [2002] . Kopczuk and Slemrod [2006] study the role of the firm in tax enforcement theory especially its function to provide information. They argue that arms-length transactions between firms and the ability of the government to check the verifiable information records considerably alleviates tax enforcement. For this reason, they show in a simple model that VAT has a great administrative advantage to retail sales tax (RST) that possess no business-to-business transactions records. This paper also emphasizes the importance of arms-length transaction records as a valuable information source for the VAT administration. In addition, based on Figure 1 , here I argue that as long as the share of arms-length transactions is not the same across activities, the optimal enforcement policy also differs among them. Next, I link this variation with inter-sectoral linkages and find the optimal policies by taking such differences into consideration.
The second role of the firm in tax enforcement is providing information through third party reporting. Kleven et al. [2009] use this function of the firm to answer why governments can tax so much nowadays.
They indicate that the standard tax evasion models like Allingham and Sandmo [1972] fail to explain the high level of tax compliance in the developed world, given the low enforcement by governments. In order to address this issue, they argue that generally a firm can collude with its employees to un-or under-report its income to the government, but in practice such collusion is fragile when the firm is big with a large number of employees. One reason for breaking the collusion is random shocks due to unintentional mistakes or conflicts within firm, another can be rational whistle blowing due to the rewards by the government. In this paper, I take this function into consideration by linking the probability of detection of informal firms to the number of their employees. In comparison to Kopczuk and Slemrod [2006] who emphasize the importance of inter-firm information networks, Kleven et al. [2009] focus on intra-firm information sources. The key advantage of VAT is enabling the government to use both of these information sources for detecting fraud and evasion. Therefore, this paper presents the optimal policy for VAT enforcement by putting together two instruments for revealing firms' true information: checking arms-length transactions and third party reporting.
The bulk of other papers that address the role of the firm in tax enforcement just focus on the direct taxes and the role of firms in indirect taxation, for the most part, is absent from the literature. Nevertheless, linking between consumers and the government, firms are crucial players for the proper payment of indirect taxes like VAT. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other paper modeling the role of inter-sectoral linkages in designing the tax enforcement system, in particular VAT. The most related paper to this is De Paula and Scheinkman [2010] who address the informality problem in a VAT setting. They consider a model in which firms have different managerial abilities and assume that above a cut-off production informal firms are detected by the government. In this setting, they show that low ability firms remain small and informal, but high abilities become formal to produce with no restriction. Then, they indicate that under VAT, (in)formal firms trade with their (in)formal peers in the production chain not the other type. Their results are based on variation in managerial ability and are silent about the industry in which the firm works. In comparison, this paper looks from a different point of view by assuming the same ability for all managers, but different sectors in which a firm can work. This approach has a great practical advantage since instead of relying on unobservable variables like ability and entrepreneurship, it addresses the optimal tax agency's policy in each sector based on measurable characteristics like linkages and connections with the other sectors.
The findings of this paper contribute to the tax enforcement literature and have important policy implications. They show how with the same level of effort, policymakers can raise VAT revenue by reallocating their enforcement among different activities. Backwardly linked sectors that are usually at the bottom of production chains should be the first objective for revealing internal information of firms by policies like higher audit rate and reward to whistle-blowers. On the other hand, forwardly linked industries, normally located up the production chain, are the best objectives for invoice cross-checking. Finally, the most enforcement expenditure should be spent in sectors with strong involvement in production networks and the least spendings -and maybe exemptions-should be dedicated to the sector with no linkage with others.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in place. While this paper models the informal firms' decisions, it assumes that such decision is an internal maximum of profit function. However, if the demand of the sector imposes a binding condition, a corner solution can be optimal and the informal firms may choose other strategies like matching or vertical integration. Moreover, the formal firms can react to an evading firm differently, but here they all act the same. Although these issues do not change the overall results, in a follow up paper (Hoseini [2013] ), they are studied in detail and the potential complementary policies are presented there. At a broader level, the model in this paper ignores some issues regarding VAT enforcement such as under-reported sales, multiple rates and misclassification of commodities which are mentioned in Smith and Keen [2006] . It also dismisses benefits of formality which are stressed in the literature like access to finance and legal institutions. Considering these issues should not change the qualitative implications of the model, which just focus on VAT collection efficiency from the view point of inter-industry connections and networks.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2, constructs the basic model and explains government's enforcement strategies. Next, in section 3, I look into the optimal enforcement policy in each sector and section 4, extends the basic model to a general CES production function. In the section 5, I empirically examine the existence of the self-enforcing feature and finally, I conclude.
The Basic Model
Consider an input-output (I-O) economy with n = 1, . . . , N competitive sectors each producing a homogeneous and unique product x n . Each product can either be used as an input of other sectors or be consumed by final consumers. The production technology of all sectors is a Leontief function; 2 its elements are labor as the source of value added 3 and intermediate inputs. For each unit of x n , a kn units of x k and a Ln units of labor are necessary. So if x kn is the amount of x k that is used for the production of x n , we have x kn = a kn x n . The labor market is competitive and labor is the numeraire so that the wage rate can be normalized to one.
In equilibrium, each product is traded by a price p n and consumer demand in each sector x n0 is constant and inelastic. 4 Thus, one can write total representative production of sector n as
Putting wage at unity, the profit of a firm in sector n will be
Since all markets are competitive, we can write
To find the equilibrium price and quantity, I employ vectors X, P , and A L with dimensionality N ×1 containing 2 Later, I will extend the model for a general CES function with elasticity εn 3 Here, labor represents all inputs other than intermediate goods. More general assumption is entering labor and capital or other factors of value-added in the production function and using k α n l 1−α n instead of ln, but it does not change any result of the model.
4 This paper models the behavior of a taxation agency and welfare concerns are not the goal here. Therefore, I assume a fixed final consumption in each sector. However, assuming an elastic demand function for households does not change the results.
x n , p n , and a Ln respectively, together with an N × N matrix A built by a kn as elements.
5 Then (1) is written
and
Similarly from (3), we have
where A is the transpose of A. Since the final demand is always nonnegative (X 0 > 0), (4) imposes that AX < X. In this case, the Leontief inverse in (5) always exists and there is unique equilibrium X: Theorem 1. Matrix A is square and nonnegative, then 
Adding VAT
Regarding taxation, consider the government imposes a uniform VAT rate t and fines all unregistered firms who had to be registered according to the law. 6 The ad valorem tax in sector n is added to its market price p n , in the sense that registered firms charge tax on their sales and issue the corresponding invoices to the buyers, who if registered can use this invoice to refund against their own tax liability. Unregistered firms, on the other hand, buy and sell at tax inclusive price, but they do not pay any tax to the government. For coexistence of formal and informal 7 markets, consistent with Keen [2008] , I assume that the number of formal and informal firms are given but they decide about their level of production. The production function is constant returns to scale (CRS) for formals and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) for the informals as a result of the expected fine by the government. 5 Throughout the paper, lower-case letters like x denotes a scalar, upper-case like X a vector, and bold upper-case like X a matrix.
6 At the moment, I assume VAT registration is compulsory for all firms in all sectors. Later, we relax this assumption and add registration threshold to the model.
7 From now on, by formal (informal), I mean registered and fully tax compliant (unregistered) under VAT. 8 I ignore the possibility of misreporting in the formal sector. However, one can assume each representative firm sells one part of its production in the formal market (x f n ) and one part in the informal (x i n ). In this case, as shown below, if the expected fine of producing x i n is the same as an informal firm with that level of production, the results do not change.
To make it more clear, as an example, consider a simple production chain for a final good R with three stages: input supplier (S), manufacturer (M ), and retailer (R) such that their pre-tax prices are p S , p M , and p R respectively. We can illustrate the value chain as 0 The superscript f represents formal sector and i informal. The main difference between the two groups is that informal firms put the tax payments in their pocket, but instead have a risk of punishment by the government c n . In the general model with N sectors the same pattern holds. According to Table 1, tax earnings cancel out the payments of representative formal firms to the government, so it takes tax-exclusive prices to measure its profit
which gives (3) as equilibrium prices.
Turning to the informal sector, Table 1 shows that informal firms benefit from evading VAT, but bear a cost c n . If this cost is zero, formal firms stay out of the market and informal firms, having no restriction, supply all market demand. However, in reality, not registering for VAT creates a risk of being detected and punished by the government. Thus, I introduce a cost function c n that shows the expected loss from VAT evasion. This cost function allows for the coexistence of formal and informal markets by making the production function of informal firms DRS. Since the production of formal firms is CRS, they are free to choose the level of production, but having a DRS production, informal firms choose a specific amount based on their optimization. On the other hand, the representative demand in each sector is given by (5). Thus, If the optimal production of informal firms is higher than total demand in a sector, informal firms supply all demand. Otherwise, they produce at the optimal level and formal firms produce the rest. Consequently, one can easily show that if final demand is high enough in all sector, the formal production is always nonzero.
Following to Allingham and Sandmo [1972] , the literature on tax evasion normally assumes that the cost of evasion c n depends on two factors. One is the value of the fine, reasonably proportional to the evasion e n , and the other is the probability of a government audit ν n -see Slemrod and Yitzhaki [2002] for a survey. In this model, I enter these properties by the following simple form:
where θ > 1, a penalty multiplier set by the government, is determined based on legal and political considerations. It should be greater than one, otherwise the marginal benefit of informality always beats its costs.
Therefore, the profit function of a representative firm in the informal sector is written as
Moreover, from (6) the amount of evasion e n is equal to
n . Hence, we can rewrite (9) as
Under perfect competition, marginal return is equal to marginal cost, so the first order condition for a representative firm in the informal sector is
The solution of (11) gives x i n which is the production of one informal firm in sector n. We are also able to find x n = x f n + x i n 9 from (5), so (in)formality in sector n can be measured. To handle the matrix algebra, we can define N × N matrices X, P , etc. from the corresponding vectors in the sense that diag(X) = X and X = XJ, where J is a vector of ones (summation vector). Then the desired formality index would be
In the next step, I define a functional form for the detection probability.
Probability of detection
Before any further analysis, we need a reasonable assumption about the probability of detection ν n . Broadly, there are two information sources for the government to check the business records. One is within-firm informations such as profit and wages, the other is external information, verifiable by another sources, such as transactions with other businesses and loans. I first explain these factors and how the government can react to them and then I define a functional form for this probability.
Firm size
On the intra-firm side, a crucial factor that determines tax evasion is the firm size. Dharmapala et al. [2011] argue that generally, enforcement of small firms may not be cost-efficient if there is fixed firm-level compliance 9 Note that in each sector n, on the production side, we have two types of representative firms: formal and informal producing x f n and x i n respectively. On the consumption side, three types of customers exist: formal and informal firms and final consumers. Thus, we can write the accounting identity as
cost. For the purpose of this model, Kleven et al. [2009] show that although theoretically a firm can collude with its employees to unreport its tax liability, in practice, if the number of employees is large, maintaining such collusion becomes very difficult. They indicate this collusion may break for a number of reasons. The first set is a random shock due to unplanned events such as a conflict between employer and employee, moral concerns of a newly hired employee, or a mistake of an employee or employer to reveal the records to the government. The other reason can be rational whistle blowing because of a rewards by the government which is common in several countries. 10 Next, Kleven et al. [2009] show that if the number of employees is large, collusion is fragile and easily breaks down by each of these reasons. Therefore, this third-party reporting value, since the probability should always be between zero and one. Therefore, I divide this term byx L which represent the level of labor that collusion always breaks. I also assume that ∀n,x L ≥ x n to ascertain that the probability is always less than one. Then, by definingx Ln =x L /a Ln , the term x i n
x Ln reflects the effect of firm size on the detection probability of an informal firm.
Firm-to-firm transactions
The second source of information for the government is the arm's-length transactions of the firm (Kopczuk and Slemrod [2006] ). These transaction records enable the government to verify them with the accounts of their VAT has a self-enforcement feature that creates an incentive for the formal firms to ensure their suppliers provide them invoices acceptable to the government. Smith and Keen [2006] indicate that the advocates of VAT imply "VAT is self enforcing in the sense that each trader has an incentive to ensure that its suppliers have themselves properly paid VAT, in order that they themselves can claim an appropriate credit."
In other word, before purchasing their input, formal firms would check whether the seller is registered for VAT and if not, there is a chance that they report the informal seller to the government. Although, as mentioned by Smith and Keen [2006] , there is an element of truth here and this intrinsic feature should not be overstated, it does not exist in other types of taxes like RST. Moreover, note that the self-enforcement feature is a one-way 10 Kleven et al. [2009] mention some example from OECD countries like the US and Japan.
effect from formal firms to their supplier not costumers. When buying, a formal firm cares about the supplier and requests invoice to send to the government for input credit. Then, the government can use the invoice to check whether the supplier is formal and if not fine the evading firm. However, when a formal firm sells a product, it issues the invoice irrespective of the buyer's type. If the new buyer is a formal firm, again it uses the invoice for input credit and the two records -formal seller's sale and formal buyer's purchaseenables the government to cross-check them together. Otherwise the invoice just informs that the product is sold, 11 regardless of whether the buyer is an informal firm or a final consumer. Thus, in this case, the government cannot distinguish between the ones that should be punished (informal firms) and not punished (final consumers).
12 To incorporate this feature in the detection probability, I utilize the share of formal firms purchase in total sales of sector n which is
The idea is that the larger the relative size of formal buyers of a sector, the bigger the share of transactions that can be checked by the government. Hence, the detection probability is increasing in this index. Note that because both markets are perfectly competitive, a single informal firm cannot change x n by changing its own production level. Thus, each firm takes x n as given when optimizing profit.
Given the two government instruments, the reaction of informal firms should also be taken into account.
To reduce trembling hand and whistle-blowing threats, informal firms can control their size. For the crosschecking risk, they should pay attention to their costumers' type. One possibility is not caring about the type of buyers and issuing a fake invoice if necessary which makes a risk of detection by cross-checking.
13
The other one, imposing a search and commitment cost, is to find an informal buyer to contract with. In order to persuade the buyer to commit, the firm may suggest a lower price and share part of the VAT evasion with the buyer. Instead it insures itself against the transactional risk. Additionally, finding such costumer is more difficult in a sector with high level of formality, so I assume that the average matching cost for one unit of evasion is µ N k=1 x f nk /x n . Here, µ reflects two factors; one is the share of total evasion ta Ln x i n that the firm has to pay for satisfying the informal buyer to cooperate, second it reflects the cost of searching for and contracting with a reliable informal customer. Therefore, it is always positive and can be greater than one. Taking µ into consideration, the informal firm matches with a desired costumer and insures (part of) its transactions against cross-checking risk, if the cost of searching for and persuading an informal buyer is less than the expected risk of detection through that risk. Otherwise, it does not care about the type of its costumers.
I now elaborate how the government can utilize the two above information sources and then translate it to a mathematical probability function for ν n . Some of the enforcement strategies are not specific to VAT 11 I assume that for each input credit, the government checks the corresponding sale's invoice. Thus, a formal firm can just get input credit for the sales that already have VAT payment invoice and no under-reporting is possible.
12 If the final demand of a sector is zero, the government can detect the informal firms through the missing invoices. However, still the informal sector can survive cross-checking by matching together. This case is discussed in Hoseini [2013] .
13 I assume that formal firms are indifferent about the type of their supplier and always inform the government about them to get input credit. This assumption is relaxed in Hoseini [2013] where formal firms can also choose not to buy from informal firms and look for a formal supplier instead.
such as identification of unregistered firms and the rate of audits -which try to reveal within-firm information.
But, as described above, a distinctive strategy for VAT is the cross-checking of the invoices which is nowadays more feasible with the advances in information technology. However, both of these strategies directly depends on the government expenditures and efforts for VAT enforcement. Thus, I assume that government policy in each sector is reflected in a function φ n = g n g , where g n is the government expenditure to enforce tax in sector n andḡ is a fixed term to ensure φ n ≤ 1. Altering across sectors, 0 ≤ φ n ≤ 1 is the key policy variable and the government seeks to find its optimum allocation for maximizing net VAT revenue. The government also determines the share λ n of the enforcement to dedicate for invoice cross-checking versus revealing insider information in each sector. This parameter determines the level of cross-checking which means how much the government tries to find and check the seller of x n that a formal customer, requesting input credit, claims to buy from. It is less than a threshold levelλ < 1 because in reality, VAT implementation, similar to other types of tax, needs some core elements like identifying and auditing the firms. So the government can never put all of its efforts just on cross-checking and firms size always plays a role in detection (∀n : λ n ≤λ).
14 Hence, I can combine all of the above factors in the following functional form:
When the enforcement expenditure g n in a sector n goes up, φ n approaches one and the government finds the informal firms in that sector with a higher probability. Note that since
n ≤ x n and x n ≤x L , the probability is always less than 1. Assuming (12), we can write the cost of evasion in the informal sector as
where ρ n = x n x Ln is the share of firms that are detected when the sector is completely informal and γ n = λ n 2(1 − λ n )ρ n is defined for the sake of better mathematical illustration in below. The following proposition shows the relation between government enforcement and formality defined as f n = x f n /x n . Proposition 1. Under cost function (13),
Proof. Appendix A.1
Since φ n is directly associated with g n , the Proposition 1 intuitively indicates that the government's attempt to find informal firms reduces the size of informal market. Moreover, note that because formality is always between zero and one, there can be a corner solution if φ n < 1 2θ .
Forward and Backward linkages
Proposition 1 indicates how formality in one sector is linked to formality in the other sectors. In this section, I define the concept of industrial linkages and show how they affect informality under VAT. To find the equilibrium formality, I employ vectors F , Φ −1 and J with dimensionality N × 1 containing f n , 1 φ n (1 − λ n )ρ n , and ones (summation vector) respectively; and Γ and X diagonal N × N matrices with γ i and x n as diagonal elements. Then (14) is written as
and we immediately get
Since γ n ≥ 0, according to Theorem 1 (replace V by ΓV ), F always has a unique solution. To provide more insight, defineF := (J − 1 2θ Φ −1 ) which is the formality vector in the absence of cross-checking (∀n, λ n = 0) and is always between zero and one. Then, from Theorem 1, (16) can be rewritten as
where 
wheref n = 1 − 1 2θφ n (1 − λ n )ρ n . Therefore, utilizing the self-enforcing feature of VAT, the government can increase the formal sector size fromf n to f n .
To elaborate more, I introduce two types of inter-industry effects: backward linkage, which measures the flow of products from other industries, and forward linkage which quantifies the flow of products to the other industries. To measure these two properties, various indices are defined in the field of linkage analysis. A popular one is proposed by Rasmussen [1957] suggesting to use the row or column sum of the Leontief inverse to find inter-sectoral linkages. Specifically, he proposes the following formulas for forward and backward linkages vectors:
Backward linkage: (20) where A is the transpose of A. If we expand (19) and (20) for each element, it gives the coefficient of each sector n:
fl n shows how much is the amount of production that goes to the other sectors (not final consumers), nor- Furthermore, the two above linkage concepts cover both vertical and horizontal inter-industry connections.
The vertical linkage is a chain of industries from up to downstream producing a final good (e.g. petroleum industries from crude oil extraction to plastics), but horizontal linkage is between two industries exchanging their differentiated products and none of them is categorized above or below the other (e.g. Fuels and Iron industries). In the simple example of Table 1 , there is a vertical linkage between Supplier, Manufacturer, and
Retailer such that S is the upstream and R is the downstream industry. In other words, S is just forwardly linked, R just backwardly and M has both types of linkages. Now, assume that we have two similar production chains A and B which also horizontally linked from the middle (Figure 2 ). In this case, the upstream industry Corollary 1. Under VAT, formality vector F is positively associated with the forward linkages matrix defined
Proof. From (16), we can write F = FL ×F whereF is non-negative.
The particular interest of Corollary 1 is in explaining Figure 1 . From (1) we have
The left hand side of (23) is the direct effect of forward linkages in (21) . Thus, we can conclude that forward linkages of an industry has a negative relationship with its final demand. Consequently, according to Corollary 1, an activity with more final demand is more likely to be informal and has a lower VAT collection efficiency.
Optimal Enforcement
After characterizing the formality of each sector, in this section, I find the optimal enforcement that is the government instrument to control informality. The first step for finding the optimal policy is defining the objective function of the government and its policy variables. The government revenue for each representative
x n is equal to
On the other hand, the government faces an enforcement expense g n in each sector which is an increasing function of φ n . If g n approaches to zero, detection becomes infeasible and if it goes up φ n approaches one.
Knowing revenues and costs, we can write the government's optimization problem
Proposition 2. The optimal government expenditure for tax enforcement in industry n is given by
where G 2 and A L are two N × 1 vector with elements g 2 n and a Ln respectively, and Λ and A L are diagonal matrices of λ n and a Ln .
Proof. Appendix A.2.
For better illustration, I rewrite (26) in the extensive form for each element
The immediate results of the Proposition 2 is that the optimal government expenditure to enforce tax in each sector depends on the square root of the tax rate divided by the surcharge rate of punishment. Also, higher g andx Ln means that the government has to spend more money to reach the same probability of detection.
Apart from these effects, (26) shows that the optimal expenditure is positively associated with backward linkages of the industry defined as (I − A Γ) −1 . This result is of particular interest since it shows how inter-industry linkages can affect the optimal policy. It can be seen that backward linkages weighted by labor intensities increase the optimal enforcement expenditure. This reflects the fact that the self-enforcement of VAT is from costumers to suppliers not vice-versa. In other words, backwardly linked industries are directly or indirectly customers of forwardly linked ones, so their compliance leads to higher compliance of their suppliers too. Therefore, they are better cases to invest for tax enforcement than not backwardly linked sectors.
Next proposition indicates the optimal share of cross-checking in each sector. x n , the optimal share of cross-checking in the government efforts in each sector is given by
whereλ n = min{λ, µ θφ n }, andλ is the maximum possible share of cross-checking in government enforcement.
Proof. Appendix A.3.
(28) states that cross-checking is optimal in sector n when it imposes a risk that is at least twice higher than the firm size threat. 16 In this case, the government should put effort into cross-checking as much as it does not persuade informal firms to contract with their peers. Moreover, the right-hand side of the inequality condition is an indicator of forward linkages -see the second term of (21) . Therefore, in contrast to φ n , λ n is positively associated with forward linkages of a sector. Putting Propositions 2 and 3 together yields the implication of interest: The government should spend more to reveal within-firm information on backwardly linked sectors and make more cross-checking in forwardly linked ones. For instance, in the simple example of Table 1 , the government should put more effort on the downstream R and try to reveal the within-firm information in this sector (e.g. tempting reward for wistle-blowers). But in S, it should dedicate the spending to check the invoices and transactions.
Although in (26), just the positive and direct effect of backward linkages on g n is visible, forward linkages can also raise g n through λ n . In comparison to the linearity of backward linkages, the impact of forward linkages on the optimal expenditures is non-linear. According to Proposition 3, if forward linkages are big enough to hold the upper inequality in (28), g n increases by factor 1 1 −λ n , otherwise it does not change by 16 Factor 2 is due to the quadratic functional form of the cost of evasion in x i n .
the level of forward linkages. Thus, most of the government spending should be dedicated to sectors that are both forwardly and backwardly involved in the production chain. In contrast, the least spendings should be given to the sectors that does not possess any linkages. Moreover, according to (24) and (27), enforcement is not beneficial in small sectors in which a Ln x n < 2ḡx L tθ and a convenient policy would be exempting these sectors from VAT.
Another important issue for implementing the optimal policy is measuring forward and backward linkages.
Like Figure 1 , a simple approximation of forward linkages is the share of final consumption to total production of a sector. This measure is enough to find the optimal λ n in (28) and thus more useful than the complicated form of (21) for policymakers. If the government has an estimate of ρ n and informality, the share of final consumption provides a simple rule: checking transactions works more efficiently than rewarding whistlerblowers if informality in sector n multiplied by 2ρ n plus the ratio of final consumption is less than one (2ρ n (1 − f n ) + x n0 /x n < 1). Estimation of backward linkages for optimal policy needs more attention. The index used in Proposition 2 is to some extent different with (20) introduced by Rasmussen [1957] . The first difference which can make approximation easier is weighting by labor intensity A L -compare the extensive forms in (22) and (27) . In this manner, by comparing (26) and (6), we see a close relationship between backward linkages index to find g n and the wage-normalized price of the product p n . Thus, the magnitude of the spending in each sector can be approximated by
where λ n , already set by the government, is known and a Ln is labor intensity or the value-added per unit of production. However, p n is not precisely equal to the backward linkages index in (26), since it does not take cross-checking ratio γ n into account. When γ n is entered into consideration, it overstates the linkages, either directly or indirectly through other sectors, with the suppliers that have strong forward linkages and thus high γ n . But, it drops sectors that are not so forwardly linked to alter λ n and γ n from zero, for measuring backward linkages.
The results of this paper have important implications in designing VAT and can increase collection efficiency. To have a sense about the magnitude of the increase in revenue, I compare two cases: (a) when the government optimizes without taking cross checking into consideration, (b) when the government follows the optimality conditions of Proposition 2 and 3. In appendix A.4, I show that if under case (a) the enforcement expenditure in each sector g a is small relative to net VAT revenue r a , the growth in revenue from choosing (b) instead of (a) is approximately equal to
where η a n = r a n /r a is the share of net revenue in sector n to total. Therefore, using the self-enforcing feature of VAT, the government can raise revenue proportional to the weighted average of backward linkages in the economy where the share of each sector in providing revenue determines the weight.
General CES production function
In this section, I extend the basic model by relaxing the Leontief production function assumption. In order to do that, I solve the basic model for a CES production function and show that the results are robust to substitution between the inputs. If the production function is a general CES function, we have
where N k=1 b kn + b Ln = 1, σ n ≤ 1, a kn ≥ 0 are the Leontief coefficients that depend upon the measuring units, x kn is the amount of product k that is used as an input of sector n, and l n is the amount of other production factors that are subject to value added tax like labor. At one extreme, if σ n = −∞, (31) becomes a
Leontief function like what we had in the previous sections. If σ n = 0, (31) is transformed to a Cobb-Douglas function and at the other extreme where σ n = 1, it gets a linear form with perfect substitution between the inputs. Next, similar to section 2, we can find the optimal choice of the informal firms.
Proposition 4. The optimal informal production under CES function is
where τ n = t(1 − θν n ) and
Proof. Appendix A.5
When we have an I-O economy H(τ ) = −τ 1 + τ and (32) transforms to (11), but in general case, H(τ ) is a complicated function to solve. Nevertheless, we can use its linear approximation to study the behavior, since 0 ≤ τ ≤ t < 1 and the higher order approximation terms approaches zero. Then, the results are similar to Proposition 1 and 2:
Proposition 5. Under cost function (13), formality f n increases by government enforcement and
Furthermore, formality of an industry is positively associated with its forward linkages matrix defined as
where A is N × N matrix with elements A (i,j) = α ij where
and the optimal government expenditure and cross-checking ratio in sector n will be
Proof. Appendix A.6
Proposition 5 indicates that the results of Section 2 and 3 are still valid and the only change is replacing a kn with α kn in (35). To see how substitution between the inputs can change the results, assume a simple case with no cross-checking. Then, from (34) and (36), under optimal enforcement informality in each sector will be tḡx Ln 2θ α Ln . It means that if α Ln > a Ln or equivalently p n < a Ln /b Ln changing the Leontief production function assumption to a CES function with a positive elasticity of substitution like Cobb-Douglas function implies less informality in sector n. Note that labor is the value-adding input in sector n and it determines the benefit from value-added tax evasion for the informal firms. When it is more expensive relative to some other intermediate inputs that push p n below a Ln /b Ln , letting the firm select between the inputs, it chooses the cheaper one which is not labor in this case. Thus, substitution between the inputs yields less use of value-adding input and less incentive for evasion. Conversely, if p n > a Ln /b Ln , labor is relatively cheap for the firm and more substitution stimulates the firm to use more of it. In this case, a CES function with positive substitution leads to more informality compared to Leontief. In sum, the results of this section indicate that the results of basic model can be generalized by allowing substitution between the inputs and then finding the optimal government policies using (36) and (37).
Empirical evidence on self-enforcing feature of VAT
In this section, I provide some evidence about the existence of VAT self-enforcement from Indian service sector. India is a good developing country to test this hypothesis given its recent policy changes in taxation. 
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Given the nation-wide service tax policy change in India, I examine the existence of self-enforcing feature by testing whether VAT has been more effective in compliance of forwardly linked activities or not. As shown in Corollary 1, the idea behind this hypothesis is that naturally, firms with strong forward linkages have more business customers and among them formal traders who prefer to buy from VAT compliant suppliers. Thus, we expect more VAT compliance among firms in forwardly linked sectors. For this purpose, I use two data sources; a firm-level survey on services, and I-O tables of Indian economy.
The principal data I use is the survey on unorganized service sector by NSSO. Using these two, I construct the (commodity × commodity) Leontief coefficient matrix A. 21 Then, Similar to (19) and (20), I compute forward and backward linkages in each sector as
Where A, is the Leontief matrix, X the diagonal production matrix, and J the summation vector. Since the minimum of all elements of (19) and (20) is one, I subtract them by vector J to normalize the starting point to zero. Therefore, if FL (BL) is equal to zero, it means that the industry does not possess any forward (backward) linkages.
To estimate the effect of intersectoral linkages on VAT registration, in the first step, I utilize the following regression setup among the sample of firms that are above registration threshold
where reg is a dummy equal to one if the firm registered for sales or service tax, 22 L s is sector's forward or backward linkages index, and X f is a vector of firm-level control variables. It includes the log of gross output and the number of workers to control for the size, and the dummy variables for partnership, mixed activity, and work on contract basis. In addition, D d is a vector of district fixed effects to control for regional factors that can affect informality within each district. Also, To control for underestimation of standard errors, the error terms are clustered at district level.
Before running regressions, I made some modifications in the data. First, I dropped the sectors that are not under service tax rule in the survey year, which leaves behind 18 and 78 services in 2001 and 2006. 23 Second, hair dressing and other beauty treatment services (NIC code 93020) is dropped, because service tax assigned just for beauty treatment not hair dressing and decomposition is not possible. 24 Finally, Because the dependent variable is binary and I control for regional fixed effects, the districts that only have unregistered samples are dropped -they just predict one outcome and thus are ineffective in MLL estimation. Table 2 shows the summary statistics. Overall, we have 14217 and 54829 enterprises in the first and second surveys, among which 2.8% and 5.9% registered for VAT respectively. The exempted firms that are below threshold comprise around 90% of total and the registration rate among them is around 3%. Only 5% of unexempted firms registered for tax in 2001-2 but with a considerable growth this number is 32.5% in 2006-7. 25 The average of forward and backward linkages are around 1.1 and 0.70 respectively and the correlation between the two is 0.36. The results probit estimation of (39) are presented in columns 1-4 of Table 3 . I report marginal effects for better interpretation. It can be seen that forward linkages has a positive and strong impact on compliance of firms that are obliged to register just after VAT adoption. One standard error increase in forward linkages in 2006-7 (0.64) raises the probability of registration by 0.065 which is about 20% of total registration rate among non-exempted firms (0.325). This effect is not significant in 2001-2 when VAT was not adopted. Moreover, the effect of backward linkages on registration is negative and insignificant both before and after VAT adoption.
Overall, the estimation 1 to 4 strongly justify the self-enforcing feature of VAT among the group of firms that are obligated to register.
In the next step, I estimate the regressions using the whole sample and compare VAT registration between the exempted and obligated firms. By doing so, we can test whether VAT self-enforcement exists even when there is no government punishment or not. Also, this method enables us to eliminate omitted variable bias at sector level, because in (39) the only sector-level variable is the linkages indicator. As mentioned above, service tax registration is compulsory for firms with turnover above a threshold level and below that it is voluntary.
In general, the below threshold firms, legally exempted from paying VAT, can work in the market and even sell to the formal firms without any fear about detection. However, linkages and VAT self-enforcement can encourage those firms to register for VAT even when they are not obliged to. If not registering for VAT reduces the demand and the number of customers by far, a firm may choose to be formal even in the absence of government compulsion.
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Some factors can hold back the trade between formal clients and unregistered suppliers that are legally exempted from VAT payment. First of all, note that although exempted firms do not pay VAT on their sales, they also do not get input credit for their purchases. Moreover, as shown in section 2, the major benefit of unregistered firms is selling the product at tax inclusive price and putting the tax payment in their pockets.
Otherwise, if they sell at tax exclusive price, they have no incentive to be unregistered, since they sell at the same price of formal firms but do not get input credit. 27 On the other hand, if a formal firm buys from an exempted supplier, it can not recover any credit on the purchased input, since no official tax is paid. Therefore,
26 For an extensive model and discussion on this see Hoseini [2013] . 27 Unfortunately the survey has no information on the price of products to compare the exempted and non-exempted ones.
the formal firm only buys from the exempted firm if the price is no more than tax exclusive price, otherwise buying from a formal supplier and getting input credit is more beneficial. As a result, there is no price that could satisfy both parties to trade and if formal demand is determinant for below threshold suppliers, they may prefer to register for VAT. This means that self-enforcing feature should exist even in the absence of any compulsion, in the sense that VAT registration is more likely in forwardly linked sector that have more forward clients.
On the other hand, some non-price factors can also prevent formal firms from purchasing from exempted firms. For instance, the formal clients that avoid illegal activities do not exactly know whether the unregistered supplier is legally exempted or pretends to be an exempted firm. More importantly, according to De Paula and Scheinkman [2010] difference in firms' managerial abilities causes high ability entrepreneurs become formal and under value-added tax trade with each other not the low abilities. Thus, registering for VAT can be a signal of the ability of the firm to encourage formal clients -which usually are big and have a significant share in the market-to purchase. For all of these reasons, we expect higher voluntary VAT registration in forwardly linked activities because they have more formal customers who want their suppliers to be formal too. To test this hypothesis empirically, I employ is the following regression setup
where e f is a dummy equal to one if firm f is exempted from service VAT registration, S s is a vector of sector dummies, and the rest of variable are exactly like (39). This method enables us to see the effect of intersectoral linkages on VAT registration while controlling for other sector-level characteristics. The coefficient β 2 reflects the effect of linkages on the difference between the registration of exempted and unexempted groups.
In other words, if we benchmark the firms that are obligated to be formal, β 2 reflects the effect of linkages on registration of firms that can choose between being formal and informal. Column 5 to 8 of Table 3 shows the results of estimation with exemption dummy and its interaction with forward and backward linkages both before and after VAT adoption. I drop gross output from control variables since it is highly correlated with the exemption dummy. 28 As we expected, generally exempted firms have less registration than obliged ones in each sector. More interestingly, forward linkages reduce the difference between the two groups but only after VAT adoption and beforehand the effect is not significant. Column 7 indicates that if two firms have identical sector, district and general firm characteristics, but one is exempted and the other is obliged to register, the difference between registration probability of exempted firms reg e and obligated firm reg o can be estimated by reg e − reg o = −0.094 + 0.005 × fl s
so moving from a sector to another by one unit more forward linkages reduces the difference by 0.5%. This can explain about 6.4% of total difference, because the mean fl s is 1.14 which makes (41) equal to 0.088 on average. Moreover, from estimations (1) and (3), we know that among non-exempted firms, registration rate is higher in forwardly linked sectors. Therefore, by dropping the registration gap between above and below threshold groups, forward linkages increase formality among exempted firms too. On the other hand, similar to columns (2) and (4), estimations (6) and (8) of Table 3 show no significant impact of backward linkages index on the registration difference between exempted and unexempted firms. This result is the same before and after VAT adoption. Therefore, the empirical evidence confirms a positive and strong impact of just forward linkages of a sector on VAT registration even when it is not obligatory. This is a reflection of self-enforcing feature of VAT and as discussed above the government can use it for more efficient tax enforcement. 
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper was giving the insight that some sectors are better cases than others to be focused on for VAT enforcement. Many developing countries have moved toward replacement of border taxes with VAT and the optimality of this reform crucially depends on VAT collection efficiency. The great administrative advantage of VAT is that in addition to general tools to reveal intra-firm information, it provides a unique inter-firm information source via its invoice system. This intrinsic feature makes evasion of forwardly linked sectors dependent to their customers' informality. Consequently, the government can utilize this unique tool to improve enforcement by spending more on backwardly linked firms to reveal their internal information.
In comparison, the government should spend extra expenses in forwardly linked sectors to cross-check invoices with the corresponding credit claims. Empirical evidence from Indian economy showed that the self-enforcing feature exists even when the registration is not compulsory.
However, the underlying model has some limitations and some further issues are addressed in an accompanying paper. First, in the model I assumed that all formal firms inform the government about their suppliers to get input credit. However, in reality, formal firms can also choose different actions in response to the behavior of informal firms and the government, especially when buying from an informal supplier creates a cost for them. Also, although in the model I take the possibility of simple matching into consideration, VAT adoption may also motivate integration between informal firms which is not discussed here. In addition, in this paper, there is no restriction from the demand side and all informal firms choose their production endogenously. But, limiting market demand can be another government instrument to reduce informality when non-complaint firms decide to match or integrate. These issues are addressed in Hoseini [2013] .
More generally, this paper neglected some other enforcement issues, as stressed in Smith and Keen [2006] , like under-reported sales, multiple rates and misclassification of commodities, self-consumption, false accountings and claims, and carousel fraud. In spite of these limitations, the findings of this paper have an important implication in VAT enforcement design and can increase VAT collection efficiency by far. The simple calculations showed that conducting the suggested administrative improvements increases VAT revenue by the level of average backward linkages in the economy.
A Mathematical Appendix A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 From (11) , at the equlibrium, we have 1
substituting (12) into (42) yields 1
n /x n = 1 − f n and x f nk = a nk x k f k , we can rearrange (43) to get
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (18), I can rewrite (67) as
and sincef
Thus the FOC of (46) becomes
and since ρ m = x m /x Lm , the optimum expenditure in each sector becomes
and in the matrix form
where G 2 is a vector with elements g
A.4 Finding growth in revenue
Here, we compare two cases: (a) the government does not check the transactions and just focus on within-firm information, (b) the government follows the optimality conditions of Proposition 2 and 3. Under policy (a)
Then, following FOC, the optimal expenditure in all sectors will be g a = tḡx L 2θ and
On the other hand, the optimal expenditure under (b) can be found from (27) and net revenue becomes
where
is backward linkages index normalized by a Ln . By subtracting (57) from (58), we can write the relative difference in revenue between policy (a) and (b)
where r a n is revenue in sector n under policy (a). In reality we expect g a -the expenditure in a single sector-be much less than total VAT revenue. Moreover, ζ n − ζn 1−λn is positive in backwardly linked sectors, but negative in sectors with strong forward and weak backward linkages. Since, each type of linkages is accompanied by the other one in another sector, these to effect compensate each other in the whole economy and the sum of them is not a great number to make g a /r a comparable to the first term. Thus, we can assume that the second term is negligible and estimate the growth in revenue by
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
By putting wage at unity, the profit of formal firms in sector n will be
Under perfect competition, profit is zero and the prices can be found by substituting (66) and (67) into (31)
Thus, having N equations similar to (68), we are able to obtain the prices p 1 , . . . , p N .
On the other hand, the profit of informal firms in each sector becomes 
Moreover, similar to Table 1 , the amount of evasion is equal to
Hence, we can rewrite (69) as
where τ n = t(1 − θν n ). Now, FOCs become 
Substituting (73) and (74) 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
First, I show that ∂ ∂φn f n > 0. Then, since 0 < τ n = t(1 − θν n ) < 1, I use the linear approximation of H(τ n ) around zero. In order to do that, first I calculate 
where dot represents derivative with respect to τ n = t − tθφ n (1 − λ n )x i n /x n + λ N k=1 x f nk /x n . Note that τ n ≥ 0, otherwise informal production would make negative profit which is impossible. Therefore from (78)- (84) n ≤ p n ,
∂τ n ∂φ n = − tθν n φ n < 0, → ∂τ n ∂φ n − 1 + τ n φ n < 0 (86) σ n − p n / n σ n − 1 ≤ 1 →Ḣ(τ n ) = −˙ n v 2 p n − σ n − p n / n σ n − 1 On the other hand, from (76) ∂f n ∂φ n = −1 tθφ n (1 − λ n ) H(τ n )( ∂τ n ∂φ n − 1 + τ n φ n ) + (1 + τ n )Ḣ(τ n ) ∂τ n ∂φ n
Applying (85)- (87) in (88) results ∂f n ∂φ n > 0
which says formality increases with higher enforcement. Now, if we put τ n = 0
n (0) = −p 
Therefore, we can estimate H(τ n ) by
Then, I find formality by rearranging (76)
Now, I write τ n = t − tθφ n (1 − λ n )(1 − f n + 2γ n N k=1 x f nk /x n ), add τ n + 1 to the both sides of (96), and take the square root of the both sides 1 + τ n = 1 + t − 2tθφ n (1 − λ n )γ n N k=1 x f nk x n (97) and finally, I apply the Taylor equivalence 0 < z < 1 → √ 1 + z ≈ 1 + z/2 in (97)
Regarding linkages, since P is given from (68) independent of X, we can generalize (16) by redefining A with elements
Then, (98) can be written in the vector form as
Hence, formality vector is the forward linkages matrix summed across columns by a positively weighted summation vector and an industry with greater forward linkages has more degree of VAT compliance.
Moreover, in this setting, the government revenue for each representative x n is equal to
Using ( 
Finally, we can use the same calculations as Appendix A.3 to find the optimal level of λ n . 
